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RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BASED ON EMPLOYER
MISPERCEPTION
DALLAN F. FLAKE*
This Article addresses the circuit split over whether Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on an employer’s misperception of an employee’s
religion. This is an especially critical issue because misperception-based
religious discrimination is likely to increase as the United States continues
to experience unprecedented religious diversification. Some courts read
Title VII narrowly to preclude such claims, reasoning that the statutory text
only prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s actual religion. Other
courts interpret the statute more expansively in concluding such claims are
cognizable because the employer’s intent is equally malicious in
misperception and conventional discrimination cases. I argue that the
statutory text is ambiguous, but the legislative history, EEOC guidance, and
the broader federal antidiscrimination regime all support recognition of
misperception-based religious discrimination claims under Title VII. The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
Inc. further confirms the validity of such claims, as the Court held that Title
VII liability is premised on an employer’s discriminatory motive, not its
actual knowledge of an individual’s religious practices. Thus, if an
employer’s motive is the touchstone for liability, it matters not whether an
employer accurately perceives an employee’s religion, so long as religion
motivates the adverse employment decision.
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INTRODUCTION
Ashley graduated at the top of her class from Brigham Young
University (BYU), which is owned and operated by The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Unlike the vast majority of BYU
students, Ashley is Catholic rather than Mormon. Ashley moves home
after graduation and applies for a teaching position at a local elementary
school. Although highly qualified for the job, Ashley does not receive
so much as a first interview. She later learns from a friend who teaches
at the school that the principal rejected her application because he
assumed she was Mormon based on where she had attended college.
The principal was suspicious of Mormons and feared that if he hired
Ashley, she would proselytize her students and coworkers.
Although Ashley was not necessarily entitled to the job in
question, she was nonetheless the victim of religious discrimination
because she was denied an equal opportunity to be considered for the
position under the school’s nonreligious hiring criteria. 1 Despite this
harm, there is a good chance Ashley will be unable to bring a claim
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—even though the statute
expressly prohibits religious discrimination in employment. This is
because courts are split over whether Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on an employer’s misperception of an individual’s religion (or
other protected characteristic).2 Some courts narrowly construe Title
VII as only prohibiting discrimination based on an individual’s actual
religion.3 Such courts would dismiss Ashley’s claim because the

1.
See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1976) (arguing that an applicant who is denied a job
because of her race need not establish that she would have received a job offer but for
her race to prove she was a victim of race discrimination; rather, “it suffices to show
that, because of her race, she was denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefit—the
opportunity to be considered under the employer’s nonracial criteria”).
2.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). For analytical purposes
this Article focuses on misperception-based religious discrimination, but its arguments
would likely apply with equal force to misperception discrimination based on Title
VII’s other protected traits.
3.
See cases discussed infra Part III.A.
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principal did not discriminate against her based on her actual religion
(Catholicism) but rather her perceived religion (Mormonism).
Such a result undercuts Title VII’s goal of eradicating
discrimination in the workplace.4 Employers who discriminate based on
their erroneous beliefs about a person’s religion are no less
discriminators simply because their perceptions were wrong. Why then
should they be allowed to discriminate based on their ignorance, when
courts have consistently held in other contexts that ignorance is not an
excuse for breaking the law?5 Despite this inconsistency, surprisingly
few commentators have pushed for judicial recognition of
misperception discrimination,6 and there are only a handful of reported
cases in which courts have allowed such claims to survive summary
dismissal.7 Judicial resistance to misperception discrimination claims
4.
See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2391, 2393 (Comm. on the Judiciary) (observing that in enacting Title VII, Congress
sought to “meet a national need” by “eradicating significant areas of discrimination on
a nationwide basis” and “eliminat[ing] discriminatory employment practices by
business”); see also id. at 2401 (“The purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate . . .
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin.”).
5.
See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563
(1971) (“[I]gnorance of the law is no defense.”); United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d
966, 968 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse.”); Cutler v. City of
New York, No. 09 Civ. 5335 (PKC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97435, at *20 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 16, 2010) (explaining that ignorance of the law did not justify failure to timely file
EEOC charge).
6.
See D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong:
“Misperception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 87, 101–02 (2013) (first using the term “misperception discrimination”);
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1290 (2005); Craig Robert Senn, Perception over
Reality: Extending the ADA’s Concept of “Regarded as” Protection Under Federal
Employment Discrimination Law, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 827 (2009); Charity
Williams, Note, Misperceptions Matter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Protects Employees from Discrimination Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 357, 358–59 (2008).
7.
See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299–300, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2012); EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2007);
Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78944, at
*8–11 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F.
Supp. 3d 841, 849–50 (D. Md. 2015); Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., No. 10 C
8196, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103310, at *19–20 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2013); Henao v.
Wyndham Vacations Resorts, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 978, 986–88 (D. Haw. 2013);
Zayadeen v. Abbott Molecular, Inc., No. 10 C 4621, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12135, at
*22–24 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2013); Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., No.
3:08-cv-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14971, at *12–13 (D. Nev. Feb.
19, 2010); Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 U.S. Dist.
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appears to stem almost entirely from the absence of language in Title
VII explicitly allowing such claims. By contrast, the Americans with
Disabilities
Act (ADA) specifically
prohibits
employment
discrimination against individuals who are “regarded as” disabled. 8
This crucial difference between Title VII and the ADA led one district
court to conclude, and several others to agree, that “Congress has
shown, through . . . the [ADA] that it knows how to enact legislation
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected
class.”9 Thus, if Congress had intended Title VII to apply to persons
mistakenly regarded as belonging to a particular religion, it would have
amended the statute accordingly.10
I argue that discrimination claims based on an employer’s
misperception of an individual’s religion should be cognizable under
Title VII. Whether Title VII prohibits misperception discrimination
cannot be determined from the statutory text alone, as the statute is
ambiguous. However, the pertinent legislative history, U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidance, and the
broader federal antidiscrimination regime all support the recognition of
such claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in EEOC
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 11 further confirms the validity of
misperception claims, as the Court held that an employer cannot escape
liability for refusing to hire an applicant whom it believes—but does not
actually know—will need a religious accommodation.12 The Court
reasoned that Title VII “does not impose a knowledge requirement . . .
[but instead] prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the
actor’s knowledge.”13 Because the Court held that Title VII liability is
premised on motivation, not knowledge, it follows that an employer
violates the statute if religion motivates an adverse employment action,
LEXIS 72551, at *14–16 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008); Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union
Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-3124, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 12, 2007); LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770–71
(D. Neb. 1999); Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277–78
(N.D. Ohio 1994); see also infra Part III for analysis of several of these cases.
8.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C), 12112(a) (2012).
9.
Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
10.
See Lewis v. N. Gen. Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“In the [ADA], Congress provided for claims based on ‘perceived’ disability or being
‘regarded as’ having a disability. If Congress had wanted to permit a similar cause of
action under Title VII for ‘perceived religion’ discrimination, it could have so
provided. It did not.” (citation omitted)).
11.
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
12.
Id. at 2032–34.
13.
Id. at 2032–33.
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regardless of whether the employer’s perception of the employee’s
religion is accurate.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explores America’s
changing religious landscape and argues that the growing diversification
of religion and religious expression increases the likelihood that
employers will discriminate based on misperceptions about an
individual’s religion. Part II explains how Title VII’s text is ambiguous
regarding misperception discrimination and considers how the statute’s
legislative history, EEOC guidance, and the broader federal
antidiscrimination scheme support the recognition of such claims. Part
III examines judicial analysis of misperception discrimination under
Title VII. Courts that reject misperception claims tend to rely on a
single provision of the statute in isolation, whereas courts that
recognize such claims typically focus on Title VII’s overarching
purposes and the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute. Part IV analyzes
the Abercrombie decision and addresses how the holding applies to
misperception-based religious discrimination. Part V discusses the
ramifications of allowing religious misperception claims after
Abercrombie.
I. RELIGIOUS MISPERCEPTION IN A CHANGING AMERICA
Misperceiving a person’s religious beliefs is hardly a new
phenomenon. But it is one that is likely to increase. This Part examines
how the United States’ religious landscape is changing both in terms of
the variety of religious sects and the ways in which people are choosing
to express—or not to express—their religious beliefs. It then considers
how these changes are likely to increase the threat of
misperception-based religious discrimination in American workplaces
already rife with religious conflict.
A. America’s Changing Religious Landscape
The United States is more religiously diverse than ever before and
will likely continue to diversify in coming years. 14 Although the United
States remains predominantly Christian, with 70.6% identifying with
some branch of the religion, non-Christian faiths continue to make

14.

See PAUL D. NUMRICH, THE FAITH NEXT DOOR: AMERICAN CHRISTIANS
6 (2009).

AND THEIR NEW RELIGIOUS NEIGHBORS
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considerable gains.15 Between 2007 and 2014 alone, the percentage of
Americans affiliated with non-Christian religions rose from 4.7% to
5.9%.16 Immigration continues to be the primary driver of religious
diversification, resulting in greater numbers of Buddhists, Muslims,
Baha’is, and other non-Christians.17 Immigration has also contributed to
greater internal diversity within established religious traditions. 18
American Judaism, for example, has become increasingly diverse
because of the influx of Jewish immigrants from Russia and Ukraine. 19
Christianity in the United States has likewise undergone a remarkable
transformation due to sizeable Latino, Filipino, and Vietnamese
Catholic communities; Korean Presbyterians; Indian Mar Thomas; and
Egyptian Copts, among many others.20
The growing diversity of religions in American society is likewise
evident in its workforce. Indeed, religious-discrimination plaintiffs have
professed an impressive range of beliefs in recent lawsuits. For
example, a Costco cashier who belonged to the Church of Body
Modification sued her employer for forcing her to cover her religiously
mandated tattoos and piercings.21 A manager filed suit after his
employer discovered he belonged to the World Church of the Creator,
which promotes white supremacy.22 An IRS agent sued the federal
government for firing her because she refused to remove her kirpan, a
Sikh ceremonial sword.23 A Walmart employee, who described his
religion as “Universal Belief System,” filed a lawsuit challenging his
employer’s policy that prohibited him from simultaneously wearing
various pieces of religious attire, including a priest’s shirt, a Muslim
headdress, a fanny pack with an anarchy symbol, a chain with multiple

15.
See PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 3
(2015) [hereinafter CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE], http://www.pewforum.org/
2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/.
16.
See id.
17.
See id. at 2, 3, 11 (Christians comprise 70.6% of the American
population, whereas Buddhists make up 0.7%, Muslims comprise 0.9%, and Hindus
and members of other world religions constitute 1.0%.).
18.
See DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN
COUNTRY” HAS NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 1–4
(2001).
19.
Id. at 4.
20.
Id.
21.
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128–30 (1st Cir.
2004).
22.
Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1015–17 (E.D.
Wis. 2002).
23.
Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 2013).
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crosses hanging from it, and a necklace with a crucifix. 24 The EEOC
recently announced a lawsuit against a New York–based health network
that required employees to participate in a belief system called
“Onionhead.”25 The Commission alleges employees were forced to
wear Onionhead buttons, participate in prayers and candle burning, and
keep only dim lighting in the workplace.26
Apart from the growing number of religious sects, there is also
greater variation in how people express their religious beliefs. For
instance, a recent survey found that the percentage of U.S. Catholics
who self-identify as “strong” members has plummeted from 46% in
1974 to 27% in 2012.27 As the strength of religious identity has
declined among Catholics, so too has weekly church attendance: 47%
of Catholics attended mass weekly in 1974, compared to just 24% in
2012.28 By contrast, religious identity among Protestants appears to
have strengthened during this same time period: the percentage of
“strong” Protestants increased from 43% to 54%, and weekly church
attendance rose from 29% to 38%. 29 Diversity is also growing within
more traditionally homogenous faiths. For example, a recent study
found a surprising amount of variation among the Amish on a wide
range of behaviors, from family planning to cow milking. 30 Within
Islam, there are substantial differences in women’s religious coverings,
with some Muslim women wearing burkas, others wearing headscarves,
others wearing face veils, and still others opting for no head covering at
all.31

24.
Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-0319, 2006 WL 1562235, at
*2–3, 6 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
25.
See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues United Health Programs of
America and Parent Company for Religious Discrimination (June 11, 2014),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-11-14.cfm.
26.
See id.
27.
PEW RESEARCH CTR., ‘STRONG’ CATHOLIC IDENTITY AT A FOUR-DECADE
LOW IN U.S. 1 (2013), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/03/Strong-CatholicIdentity-version-3-13-13-for-web.pdf.
28.
Id. at 2.
29.
Id. at 1, 3.
30.
See generally Mark Scolforo, New Research Shows Diversity Among US
Amish Groups, DENVER POST (June 3, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/
nationworld/ci_23378069/new-research-shows-diversity-among-us-amish-groups
(describing key findings from study).
31.
See Faegheh Shirazi & Smeeta Mishra, Young Muslim Women on the Face
Veil (Niqab): A Tool of Resistance in Europe but Rejected in the United States, 13 INT’L
J. CULTURAL STUD. 43, 44–47 (2010) (explaining variations in veiling practices among
Muslim women).
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One of the most significant changes in America’s religious
landscape is the increasing fluidity of religious affiliation. Nearly half
of American adults “have either switched religious affiliation, moved
from being unaffiliated with any religion to being affiliated with a
particular faith, or dropped any connection to a specific religious
tradition altogether.”32 Whereas older Americans who change religious
affiliations tend to switch “from one family to another within a
religious tradition,” affiliation changes tend to be much more drastic
among younger Americans.33 Nearly three-fourths of adults under age
thirty who change religious affiliations leave one religious tradition for
another or for no religion at all.34 While it is relatively common for
Americans to switch religious affiliations, recent research suggests that
most people who leave a religion choose not to affiliate with another
religion. Between 2007 and 2014, the percentage of “unaffiliateds”
jumped from 16.1% to 22.8%—an increase of 6.7 percentage points in
just seven years.35 Importantly, nonaffiliation should not be mistaken
for nonbelief: a full two-thirds of unaffiliated adults still believe in
God, more than half feel “a deep connection with nature and the
earth,” approximately one-third classify themselves as “‘spiritual’ but
not ‘religious,’” and one-fifth pray daily.36 Despite their nonaffiliation,
this growing segment of Americans is still entitled to Title VII’s
protection from religious discrimination. Courts have consistently held
that a lack of formal religious affiliation in no way disqualifies a
plaintiff from asserting a religious discrimination claim under Title
VII.37
32.
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 5
(2008),
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/05/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
33.
Id. at 33.
34.
Id.
35.
See CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 15, at 3.
36.
See PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS & PUB. LIFE, “NONES” ON THE RISE:
ONE-IN-FIVE ADULTS HAVE NO RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 9–10 (2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf.
37.
See, e.g., Scott v. Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Bd., 963 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547,
559 n.11 (W.D. Va. 2013) (plaintiff who described her religious beliefs as “orthodox
Christianity” not precluded from bringing Title VII claim based on lack of formal
religious affiliation because “the statute protects persons who are not members of
organized religious groups”); see also EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731
F.3d 1106, 1117 (10th Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2008 (2015)
(“Religion includes not only traditional, organized religions . . . but also religious
beliefs that are new, uncommon, not part of a formal church or sect, only subscribed to
by a small number of people, or that seem illogical or unreasonable to others.” (quoting
EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 12-I(A)(1) (2008), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
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A final trend with important ramifications for misperception
discrimination is the growing number of Americans who mix multiple
faiths, rather than fitting neatly into a singular religious classification.
A Pew survey found that “large numbers of Americans engage in
multiple religious practices, mixing elements of diverse traditions.” 38
For instance, it is not uncommon today for Americans to “blend
Christianity with Eastern or New Age beliefs such as reincarnation,
astrology and the presence of spiritual energy in physical objects.” 39
The survey also found that more than one-third of Americans either
regularly (9%) or occasionally (26%) attend worship services at more
than one place, and nearly one-quarter report sometimes attending
religious services of a faith different from their own. 40 The study
predicts that as religiously mixed marriages become increasingly
common, involvement in multiple faith communities will become even
more normalized.41
The foregoing trends illustrate the growing complexity of religion
in the United States today. While it has never been wise to make
assumptions about a person’s religious beliefs, it is even less so now.
Not all Amish drive buggies, not all Jews abstain from eating pork, and
not all Catholics attend mass. Women wear headscarves for both
religious and secular reasons, Mormons live in places other than Utah,
and some Jehovah’s Witnesses donate blood. Moreover, most people
who are unaffiliated with formal religion are not atheists, not everyone
who attends weekly services is religious, and some people consider
themselves members of multiple faiths. In short, as the United States
continues to experience unprecedented religious diversification, the
potential for misperceiving a person’s religion will only increase.
B. Religious Misperception in the Workplace
It is often more difficult to correctly assess people’s religious
beliefs than their race, color, sex, or even national origin. Unlike Title
VII’s other protected traits, a person’s religion generally cannot be

religion.pdf); Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 n.15 (N.D.
Ind. 2001) (noting that Title VII has a “broad definition” of religious belief).
38.
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, MANY AMERICANS MIX MULTIPLE
FAITHS 1 (2009), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/12/multiplefaiths.pdf.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
See id. at 2 (discussing link between religiously mixed marriages and
attending multiple types of worship services).
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detected from outward appearance alone. 42 Even national origin is more
readily discernable than religion, as it tends to be more socially
acceptable to ask other people where they are from than about their
religious beliefs. Consequently, a person may look for clues about
others’ religious identity based on where they are from, the schools
they attend, their manner of dress and grooming, their dietary
restrictions, their vocabulary, their names, and a host of other
characteristics. This is problematic for several reasons, not least of
which is the fact that Americans tend to be fairly ignorant about
religions other than their own.43 The Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life’s study of Americans’ religious knowledge paints a fairly
bleak picture in this regard.44 On average, respondents correctly
answered just sixteen of thirty-two religious knowledge questions in the
survey.45 Fewer than two-thirds (63%) correctly named Genesis as the
first book of the Bible, about half (52%) said, incorrectly, that
Catholicism teaches that the bread and wine used for Communion are
merely symbolic of the body and blood of Jesus, fewer than one in five
(16%) correctly identified Protestantism as the religion that traditionally
teaches that salvation comes through faith alone, fewer than half (45%)
correctly answered that the Jewish Sabbath begins on Friday, and just
over half (54%) named the Koran as the holy book of Islam. 46
Additionally, only about one-third (38%) correctly associated Vishnu
and Shiva with Hinduism, and fewer than half (47%) knew the Dalai
Lama is Buddhist.47
In short, conditions are ripe for religious misperception in the
workplace, given the growing complexity of religion, the lack of
outward manifestations of a person’s religion, the reluctance to inquire

42.
This is not to suggest that matters of racial, sexual, or national origin
identity are necessarily straightforward. See Greene, supra note 6, at 101 (“With
increased immigration, cultural diversity, interracial marriages, and transracial
adoptions, as well as more formal recognition of mixed-race classifications and more
fluid conceptualizations of gender, racial, and cultural identity, courts will likely
encounter more discrimination cases where an alleged dissonance exists between the
employer’s categorization of an employee and the employee’s self-identification.”).
43.
See STEPHEN PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN
NEEDS TO KNOW—AND DOESN’T 1 (2007) (“Americans are both deeply religious and
profoundly ignorant about religion.”).
44.
See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE
SURVEY (2010), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2010/09/religious-knowledge-fullreport.pdf.
45.
Id. at 6.
46.
Id. at 20–29.
47.
Id. at 8.

2016:87

Misperception-Based Religious Discrimination

97

about others’ religious beliefs, and general ignorance about religion.
Therefore, the probability is high that employers, who likely are not
experts on the subtle nuances of religious diversity, will misperceive
the religious beliefs of their employees. The potential for
misperception-based religious discrimination is further heightened by
the fact that the American workplace is already “a tinderbox for
religious conflict.”48 Media reports of religious discrimination at work
seem a near daily occurrence.49 The EEOC has also experienced an
uptick in both the number and percentage of charges alleging religious
discrimination. In 1997, the EEOC received 1,709 religious
discrimination complaints, constituting 2.1% of all charges. 50 By 2015,
that number more than doubled to 3,502, which constituted 3.9% of all
charges.51 In light of this trend, the EEOC has become more proactive
in educating employers about religious discrimination. For example, in
the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the EEOC issued
guidance on the rights of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs
under the employment laws after experiencing what it characterized as
“a significant increase in the number of charges alleging workplace
discrimination based on religion and/or national origin.” 52 More

48.
Dallan F. Flake, Image is Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious
Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 703 (2015).
49.
See, e.g., Kate Abbey-Labertz, Ford Worker Fired for Anti-Gay Comment
Sues for Religious Discrimination, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015, 9:23 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/thomas-banks-fordlawsuit_55a42530e4b0a47ac15d2669 (reporting that ex-employee filed a religious
discrimination claim after Ford fired him for posting an anti-gay comment on the
company website); Paula Burkes, EEOC Files Lawsuit Against UPS on Religious
Discrimination Claims, OKLAHOMAN (July 21, 2015), http://newsok.com/eeoc-fileslawsuit-against-ups-on-religious-discrimination claims/article/5435222 (reporting that
the EEOC has sued UPS for religious discrimination based on its grooming policy that
prohibits certain male employees from wearing beards or growing their hair below
collar length); EEOC Sues Rotten Ralph’s Restaurant for Religious Discrimination,
NAT’L L. REV. (July 12, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/eeoc-sues-rottenralph-s-restaurant-religious-discrimination (discussing EEOC lawsuit against restaurant
that terminated a Muslim server for wearing a headscarf to work); NC Dunkin’ Donuts
to Pay $22,000 to Settle Religious Discrimination Lawsuit, FOX8 (July 16, 2015, 9:18
PM), http://myfox8.com/2015/07/16/nc-dunkin-donuts-to-pay-22000-to-settle-religiousdiscrimination-lawsuit/ (reporting settlement of lawsuit alleging Dunkin’ Donuts refused
to hire Seventh-Day Adventist applicant because he could not work Saturdays).
50.
Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
51.
Id.
52.
Questions and Answers About Workplace Rights Muslims, South Asians,
and Sikhs under the Equal Employment Opportunity Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
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recently, the EEOC issued a question-and-answer guide on religious
garb and grooming in response to growing concerns that employer
dress codes are unfairly stifling employees’ religious expression. 53
Given the current state of religion in America, and in the
workplace in particular, it is critical that courts are unified in their
approach to misperception-based religious discrimination. Failure to do
so not only potentially works an injustice to the victims of such
discrimination but may also disincentivize employers from attempting
to understand an employee’s religious beliefs. Because of the
complexity of religion today, it would be too easy for an employer to
escape liability by pleading ignorance about a person’s religion. If
courts continue to allow employers to discriminate so long as they get a
person’s religion wrong, what motivation will employers ever have to
get it right?
II. TITLE VII AND MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION
Because Title VII does not explicitly prohibit misperception
discrimination, it is the province of the courts to determine whether
Congress intended for the statute to cover such claims. 54 The text of
Title VII itself is ambiguous as to whether misperception discrimination
claims are cognizable under the statute. However, other sources,
including the relevant legislative history, EEOC guidance, and the
broader federal antidiscrimination regime, support the conclusion that
Congress did, in fact, intend for Title VII to cover misperception
discrimination.
A. The Statutory Text
It is unclear from Title VII’s text alone whether the statute
prohibits misperception discrimination. This is because inconsistencies
in two key provisions render it susceptible to different interpretations.

OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/backlashemployee.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
53.
Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION [hereinafter Religious
Garb and Grooming], http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_
grooming (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
54.
See Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning
Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1299, 1299 (1975) (“[T]he function of a court when dealing with a statute is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”).
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The first provision, § 2000e-2(a)(1), prohibits employers from refusing
to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating “against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”55 Standing alone, courts could—and sometimes do—
interpret this provision narrowly as prohibiting only discrimination that
is based on an individual’s actual religion or other protected trait. 56 This
is because the phrase “because of such individual’s” immediately
precedes the list of protected traits, suggesting a discrimination claim
must be rooted in an individual’s actual, rather than perceived,
characteristic.
Of course, § 2000e-2(a)(1) is not a standalone provision but must
be read in conjunction with the rest of Title VII.57 Significantly,
Congress added § 2000e-2(m) to the statute in 1991 to clarify that an
employer commits an unlawful employment practice “when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 58 Because
subsection (m) does not include the “because of such individual’s”
language present in subsection (a)(1), when read in isolation subsection
(m) appears to prohibit employment decisions motivated by religion
more generally. It seems that if Congress had intended to only ban
discrimination motivated by a person’s actual religion, it could have
done so easily enough by making the language of subsection (m)
consistent with the language of subsection (a)(1). The fact that
Congress chose not to use such language raises the possibility that it
never meant for Title VII to apply only to discrimination based on a
person’s actual characteristics. There is a clear conflict between
subsections (a)(1) and (m). Under the former, Ashley could not bring a
Title VII claim because the principal did not discriminate against her
“because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 59 But under the latter,
Ashley could bring suit because “religion . . . was a motivating factor”
in the employment decision.60 How could Title VII simultaneously
recognize and reject Ashley’s claim? Either the statute prohibits
55.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
56.
See cases discussed infra Part III.A.
57.
See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that all parts of a statute must be construed together without
according undue importance to a single or isolated portion).
58.
§ 2000e-2(m).
59.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
60.
§ 2000e-2(m).
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misperception discrimination or it does not; it cannot do both. Because
the statutory text is capable of two meanings, it is impossible for courts
to discern Congress’ intent by examining the statute’s plain language
alone.61 When a statute is ambiguous, which is the case here, 62 courts
“seek guidance in the statutory structure, relevant legislative history,
congressional purposes expressed in the [pertinent act], and general
principles” of law applicable to the circumstances of the statute to
determine the appropriate interpretation.63
B. Legislative History
Title VII is widely regarded as one of the most significant pieces
of civil rights legislation Congress has ever enacted. 64 From the outset,
Congress made clear that “[t]he purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate,
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures,
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national
origin.”65 Although courts may disagree over how to interpret various
provisions of the statute, they are unified in their understanding that the
intent of Title VII is to “eradicat[e] prohibited forms of discrimination

61.
See In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438, 446 n.11 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992)
(holding that tension between statutory provisions “creates an ambiguity that renders
this so-called ‘plain meaning rule’ inapplicable” (citing United States v. Fairman, 947
F.2d 1479, 1481–82 (11th Cir. 1991))).
62.
See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 736–37 (1985)
(declaring that when a statute is capable of more than one reasonable reading, it is
ambiguous on its face); United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Under statutory interpretation, a statute is ambiguous if it is ‘capable of being
understood in two or more possible senses or ways.’” (quoting Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)).
63.
Lorion, 470 U.S. at 737; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 345–46 (1997) (interpreting ambiguous term in Title VII by considering the
“primary purpose” of the statute).
64.
See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS
OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 6 (2d ed. 2007) (“In its provisions in Title VII,
the act created the most important of the statutory prohibitions against employment
discrimination and the one that most clearly expanded upon the protection offered by
the Constitution.”); Norbert Schlei, Foreword to BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW vii (2d ed. 1983) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964
was the most important civil rights legislation of this century. Title VII of that Act . . .
has been its most important part.”); Hubert H. Humphrey, Preface, 20 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 219, 219 (1976) (“In my opinion, winning passage of enforceable federal standards
to achieve equal employment opportunity surely was one of the most significant
legislative actions of this generation.”).
65.
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2401; see also 110 CONG. REC. 13079–80 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
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from the workplace.”66 According to the Supreme Court, “The
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered . . . stratified
job environments to the disadvantage of . . . minority citizens.”67 The
Court has further explained that the “intent to drive employers to focus
on qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national origin is
the theme of a good deal of the statute’s legislative history.” 68
Although the legislative record does not directly reference
misperception discrimination, it nonetheless contains important insights
into what Congress hoped to accomplish through Title VII. An
interpretive memorandum entered into the Congressional Record by
Senators Case and Clark, co-managers of the bill in the Senate, is
particularly noteworthy in its explanation that “[t]o discriminate is to
make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and
those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are
prohibited . . . are those which are based on any five of the forbidden
criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”69 The authors’
concern lay not with whether a person claiming discrimination was
actually black or male or Baptist; instead, they sought to enact
sweeping legislation to eliminate distinctions and differential treatment
in employment “based on” any of the protected traits more generally.
Title VII’s legislative history is replete with references to enacting
a national policy of equal opportunity in employment free from
wrongful discrimination, yet makes frustratingly little mention of the
intended scope of the statute.70 However, further insight into Congress’
66.
Martin v. United Way of Erie Cnty., 829 F.2d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 1987);
see also Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting
that joint employer doctrine “serves Title VII’s purpose of eliminating ‘discrimination
in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin’” (quoting Lucido
v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y 1977)));
Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 104 (1st Cir. 2006)
(referencing Title VII’s “dual purposes of eliminating discrimination and making its
victims whole” (citing Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997)));
Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1975)
(explaining Title VII’s purpose is to “eliminate all discriminatory employment
practices” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2401)).
67.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
68.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989).
69.
110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added).
70.
See Patricia Davidson, The Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII:
Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV.
203, 205 (1984).
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intent can be discerned from two other sources. First, in considering
the Title VII-amending Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),
Congress “openly discussed” concerns over employers discriminating
against female employees based on their misperceptions about women
of childbearing age.71 Congress emphasized the need not just to protect
women who are pregnant, have given birth, or who experience related
medical conditions, but also those who may be misperceived as such:
[T]he assumption that women will become pregnant and leave
the labor force leads to the view of women as marginal
workers, and is at the root of the discriminatory practices
which keep women in low-paying and dead-end jobs.
....
. . . Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women
are marginal workers. Until a woman passes the child-bearing
age, she is viewed by employers as potentially pregnant.
Therefore, the elimination of discrimination based on
pregnancy in these employment practices . . . will go a long
way toward providing equal employment opportunities for
women, the goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.72
Thus, the legislative history of the PDA illustrates congressional
concern not only with discrimination based on a person’s actual status
but also discrimination that stems from stereotypes and unfounded
assumptions.
Congress’ intent to prohibit misperception discrimination under
Title VII is further supported by a Senate committee report discussing
the inclusion of “regarded as” language in the ADA:
[T]he new definition clarifies the intention to include those
persons who are discriminated against on the basis of
handicap, whether or not they are in fact handicapped, just as
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not the
person discriminated against is in fact a member of a racial
minority. This subsection [protects] . . . those persons who do
71.
Senn, supra note 6, at 851 (quoting Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2012))).
72.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3, 6–7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4749, 4751, 4754–55 (Comm. on Educ. & Labor).
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not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as
having . . . [because they] may be subjected to discrimination
on the basis of their being regarded as handicapped. 73
Although the committee observed that the ADA’s “regarded as”
language is consistent with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, it could
have made this same comparison to Title VII; the antidiscrimination
language throughout the Civil Rights Act is nearly identical.74
In short, Congress enacted Title VII with the clear intent of
eradicating certain forms of discrimination from the workplace. There
is nothing in the legislative history that suggests Congress intended to
limit employer liability to only discrimination based on a person’s
actual religion. To the contrary, the legislative history reflects
Congress’ goal of eliminating discrimination more broadly whenever a
protected trait such as religion forms the basis of an adverse
employment action. Moreover, in
considering subsequent
antidiscrimination legislation, including the PDA and the ADA,
Congress highlighted the importance of prohibiting all forms of
invidious discrimination, whether based on a person’s actual or
perceived characteristics.
C. EEOC Guidance
The EEOC’s position on misperception discrimination is critical
because, although nonbinding, courts often defer to the Commission on
matters of Title VII interpretation.75 The EEOC has long insisted
73.
S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 17–18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6373, 6389–90.
74.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in
federally-funded programs and activities based “on the ground of race, color, or
national origin”), with § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), and
§ 2000e-2(m) (making unlawful any adverse employment action where “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice”).
75.
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
(“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
[the Fair Labor Standards] Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP,
562 U.S. 170, 179 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (EEOC’s statements in its
Compliance Manual merit judicial deference as to interpretation of language in Title
VII).
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misperception discrimination claims of all types are cognizable under
Title VII. The federal regulations contain the EEOC’s most detailed
explanation of its position in the context of national origin
discrimination: “The Commission defines national origin discrimination
broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment
opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place
of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or
linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”76 The regulation
makes clear that a national origin claim need not be based on a person’s
actual place of origin but can also arise from the misperception that a
person is of a particular origin because she possesses certain
characteristics of that national origin group. The regulation further
explains that the Commission will examine “with particular concern”
allegations of national origin discrimination based on the perception that
an individual belongs to a national origin group because of her
association with persons of a national origin group or organizations that
promote the interests of a national origin group, participation in
activities generally associated with persons of a national origin group,
or because her name is associated with a national origin group. 77
The EEOC is even more explicit about its position on
misperception discrimination in other commentary. Expounding on the
federal regulation, the Commission explained that “to have a claim of
national origin discrimination under Title VII, it is not necessary to
show that the alleged discriminator knew the particular national origin
group to which the complainant belonged. . . . [I]t is enough to show
that the complainant was treated differently than others because of his
or her foreign accent, appearance or physical characteristics.” 78
76.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2015). One question this regulation and subsequent
EEOC guidance leaves open is whether the Commission believes that for a
misperception discrimination claim to be actionable, an employer’s misperception must
bear some reasonable connection to an individual’s actual characteristics. What if the
individual does not possess such characteristics and the employer misperceives him as
belonging to a certain national origin group anyway? More to the point, what if an
employer believes a Jewish employee is Methodist, even though the employee wears a
yarmulke, studies the Torah on his lunchbreak, observes Jewish holidays, is unavailable
to work Friday nights, and even directly tells the employer he is Jewish? Misperceiving
the employee as Methodist seems unreasonable, but should the employer’s
unreasonableness negate its liability? Although the EEOC has yet to address this issue,
it seems doubtful the Commission would construe its own regulations in this way.
Whether one’s misperception is reasonable seems irrelevant to either intent or harm.
Nevertheless, the EEOC should consider clarifying this issue in future guidelines.
77.
Id.
78.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg.
85,632, 85,633 (Dec. 29, 1980).
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Elsewhere the EEOC has asserted that Title VII prohibits discrimination
“based on the employer’s belief that [an individual] is a member of a
particular national origin group, for example, discrimination against
someone perceived as being Arab based on his speech, mannerisms,
and appearance, regardless of how he identifies himself or whether he
is, in fact, of Arab ethnicity.”79
Although most EEOC guidance focuses on perceived national
origin, the Commission has made clear that its interpretation of Title
VII applies to other protected traits, including religion. For example,
the EEOC has cautioned that “[a]t this time, employers and unions
should be particularly sensitive to potential discrimination or
harassment against individuals who are - or are perceived to be Muslim, Arab, Afghani, Middle Eastern or South Asian (Pakistani,
Indian, etc.).”80 In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC provides a
hypothetical acknowledging the illegality of misperception-based
religious discrimination: “Thomas, who is Egyptian, alleges that he has
been harassed by his coworkers about his Arab ethnicity. He also has
been subjected to derogatory comments about Islam even though he has
told his coworkers that he is Christian. Thomas’ charge should assert
both national origin and religious discrimination.”81 In its recent
guidance on religious garb and grooming, the EEOC provides a second
hypothetical regarding religious misperception, albeit in a slightly
different context:
Adarsh, who wears a turban as part of his Sikh religion, is
hired to work at the counter in a coffee shop. A few weeks
after Adarsh begins working, the manager notices that the
work crew from the construction site near the shop no longer
comes in for coffee in the mornings. When the manager
makes inquiries, the crew complains that Adarsh, whom they
mistakenly believe is Muslim, makes them uncomfortable in
light of the anniversary of the September 11th attacks. The

79.
Section 13: National Origin Discrimination, EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, § 13-II (Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE MANUAL 2002],
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html.
80.
Employment Discrimination Based on Religion, Ethnicity, or Country of
Origin, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/fs-relig_ethnic.cfm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2016); see also EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-II (2006) [hereinafter
COMPLIANCE
MANUAL
2006],
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf
(“Discrimination against an individual based on a perception of his or her race violates
Title VII even if that perception is wrong.”).
81.
COMPLIANCE MANUAL 2002, supra note 79, at § 13-II.
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manager tells Adarsh that he will be terminated because the
coffee shop is losing the construction crew’s business. The
manager has subjected Adarsh to unlawful religious
discrimination by taking an adverse action based on customer
preference not to have a cashier of Adarsh’s perceived
religion. Adarsh’s termination based on customer preference
would violate Title VII regardless of whether he was correctly
or incorrectly perceived as Muslim, Sikh, or any other
religion.82

According to this example, an employer not only can be held liable
for its own misperceptions about a person’s religion but also for taking
adverse action based on the misperceptions of others.
D. Other Federal Antidiscrimination Laws
A final source of interpretive guidance is the broader federal
antidiscrimination scheme. It is not uncommon for courts to apply the
analytical framework of one antidiscrimination law to another in light
of their shared goal of eradicating discrimination from the workplace. 83
Because the ADA is the only federal statute that explicitly prohibits
“regarded as” discrimination, it is worth considering whether the
statute’s language should have any bearing on whether Title VII
similarly prohibits misperception discrimination. On the one hand,
courts that reject misperception claims under Title VII almost
universally point to the fact that the ADA contains specific “regarded
as” language, whereas Title VII does not, as proof that Congress did
not intend for misperception discrimination to be cognizable under Title
VII.84 But on the other hand, this difference in the statutory texts does
not have to be dispositive if courts focus on the similarities between the
ADA and Title VII in terms of both philosophies and protections.

82.
Religious Garb and Grooming, supra note 53.
83.
See, e.g., Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting
that because the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII “all serve the same purpose—to prohibit
discrimination in employment against members of certain classes. . . . [I]t follows that
the methods and manner of proof under one statute should inform the standards under
the others as well”(quoting Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153 (3rd Cir.
1995)); Kroske v. US Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
“the ADEA shares a common purpose with Title VII,” such that its antidiscrimination
provisions are “modeled upon the prohibitions of Title VII” (citing McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995)).
84.
See infra Part III.A for analysis of cases so holding.
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Indeed, courts have repeatedly held that Title VII and the ADA must be
interpreted consistently in light of their shared purpose. 85
In advocating for the extension of “regarded as” protection under
Title VII, Professor Craig Robert Senn explains that the ADA, Title
VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) have
long shared “an identical congressional and judicial philosophy” that
“employer perception or stereotype is an appropriate justification for
imposing employment discrimination liability, even when that
perception or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate.”86 He points out
that when Congress enacted the ADA, it expressed concern about
“myths, fears and stereotypes,” “generalizations,” “presumptions,”
“prejudging,” “preconceived and . . . erroneous judgment . . . based
on labeling,” “negative attitudes,” “misconceptions,” “unfounded,
outmoded stereotypes and perceptions,” “false presumptions, . . .
misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and
pernicious mythologies,” and “stereotypical assumptions.” 87 These
same concerns have surfaced in the ADEA context, where Congress
and the Supreme Court have discussed age-related “negative
stereotypes,” “pervasive belief,” “myth,” “wrong[] assum[ptions],”
“perception,” and “inaccurate and denigrating generalization.” 88 In the
Title VII context, Congress and the Supreme Court have used virtually
identical terminology (e.g., “assumption,” “view,” “stereotype,”
“stereotyping,” and “belief”) in expressing discrimination-related
concerns.89 Professor Senn argues that these interchangeable terms and
concerns across various federal antidiscrimination statutes evidence a
“central philosophy” that discrimination based on misperceptions and
stereotypes is unlawful.90 It therefore follows that “[c]omparable
perception-based philosophies should translate to comparable
perception-based protections.”91
85.
EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.11 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“Due to the similarities between the ADA and Title VII, we generally interpret those
statutes consistently.”); EEOC v. Valero Refining-Texas L.P., No. 3:10-CV-398, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42776, at *9 n.3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2013) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit
interprets the language of the ADA consistently with that of Title VII.”); Gretzula v.
Camden Cnty. Technical Sch. Bd. of Educ., 965 F. Supp. 2d 478, 488 (D.N.J. 2013)
(“Title VII and the ADA should be interpreted consistently . . . .”).
86.
Senn, supra note 6, at 827, 847.
87.
Id. at 854 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30, 58 (1990); H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 30 (1990)).
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 855.

108

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Professors Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario Barnes contend
that “there is nothing that prevents a court from using doctrinal
analyses and understandings from other antidiscrimination statutes to
assist in understanding the operation of discriminatory conduct within
the Title VII context.”92 Given the shared philosophies and purposes of
Title VII and the ADA, courts regularly rely on doctrinal analyses and
understandings from Title VII to interpret the ADA. For example, in
determining whether the ADA permits suits against individual
defendants, a district court noted that the statute is similar to Title VII
both in purpose and remedial structure and that the Fifth Circuit had
required in a separate case that “the language of Title VII and the ADA
dictates a consistent reading of the two statutes.”93 In considering the
validity of hostile work environment claims under the ADA, the Tenth
Circuit likewise relied on the statute’s similarities to Title VII in
concluding that “nothing indicates that Congress intended
disability-based employment discrimination to be treated any less
expansively.”94
Just as courts have relied on Title VII for guidance in interpreting
the ADA, so too can they look to the ADA in discerning whether
misperception discrimination claims are cognizable under Title VII.
Professors Onwuachi-Willig and Barnes urge that “[t]he turn to the
‘regarded as’ prong need not be understood as literal, but can be
encouraged as an intellectual tool to assist the court in answering the
critical question: ‘How is discrimination working?’” 95 Given the
similarities between the ADA and Title VII, and in particular their
common goal of eliminating discrimination, it would be inconsistent for
92.
Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 6, at 1328.
93.
McLennan v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., No. 3:12-CV-00531, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105858, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2012) (quoting Flowers v. S. Reg’l
Phys. Serv., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001)).
94.
Lanman v. Johnson Cnty., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2004); see
also, e.g., Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1164 (10th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that the definition of employer is substantially similar under the ADA and
Title VII and applying Title VII cases to disability discrimination analysis), vacated in
part on other grounds by 312 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Brown v. Brody,
199 F.3d 446, 456 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[c]ourts of appeals routinely
apply the same standards to evaluate Title VII claims as they do ADA claims. . . . ”),
Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting reasons for
precluding individual supervisor liability under Title VII apply equally to ADA);
Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1380, 1386 (S.D. Cal.
2014) (holding that ADA retaliation claims must be analyzed under same standards as
Title VII retaliation, “[g]iven the similar use of the ‘because’ of language in both
[provisions]”).
95.
Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 6, at 1328.
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Congress to prohibit discrimination based on misperceptions about an
employee’s abilities but not an employee’s religion. It is unlikely that
Congress intended such a result, especially where both types of
discrimination seem equally intentional and harmful. There is no
hierarchy of protected statuses under the federal antidiscrimination
laws: the prohibition against employment discrimination applies equally
to religion, disability, age, sex, race, and a host of other
characteristics.96 It therefore follows that courts should interpret Title
VII and the ADA as consistent in prohibiting misperception-based
discrimination.
III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION
Misperception discrimination claims are a relatively recent
phenomenon, with the first case not arising until 1994—a full three
decades after Title VII’s enactment. 97 Although the courts have
considered this issue more than two dozen times since then, the
misperception discrimination jurisprudence remains far from settled.
This is because the vast majority of these cases are decided at the
district level and thus generally lack the analytical depth or precedential
weight of appellate cases. Just three federal courts of appeals have
addressed misperception discrimination under Title VII: the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits allow such claims,98 whereas the Fourth Circuit
rejects them.99 Two other courts of appeals, the Third and Ninth
Circuits, have recognized misperception claims under other statutes. 100
96.
See James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000
Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2004) (Despite arguable differences
between religion and other protected statuses under Title VII, “religion’s inclusion [in
Title VII] enshrined it as something beyond the reach of employers in making relevant
workplace decisions and, in so doing, equated it with other indisputably immutable
characteristics, such as race or sex, at least for the purpose of legal protection.”).
97.
See Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1263–65
(N.D. Ohio 1994).
98.
See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299–300 (11th Cir.
2012); EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2007).
99.
El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., 451 F. App’x 257, 257 (4th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
100. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571–72 (3d Cir. 2002)
(endorsing perception theory of retaliation under the ADA); Estate of Amos v. City of
Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a race-based
misperception discrimination claim was cognizable under § 1983 because the
defendant’s “alleged discrimination is no less malevolent because it was based upon an
erroneous assumption”).
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Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities 101 was the first case
to address misperception discrimination. Arthur Perkins alleged his
employer discriminated against him based on his status as a Native
American.102 The County moved for summary judgment on the ground
that Perkins was not a member of a protected class because he was not
actually Native American.103 After engaging in a lengthy analysis of the
evidence of Perkins’ ancestry, the court determined the question of
whether Perkins was Native American was too close for summary
judgment.104 Although Perkins himself never raised the issue of
misperception discrimination, the court explained that there was “an
alternative, and perhaps more significant,” reason to deny summary
judgment that required no proof of Perkins’ ancestry. 105 The court
reasoned that because there was evidence that the County had perceived
Perkins as Native American based on his physical features, the
County’s subjective belief that Perkins was Native American—not his
actual ancestry—controlled whether he was a member of a protected
class.106
Without the benefit of any precedent to support its conclusion, the
court looked instead to Title VII’s purpose and concluded,
“[C]onsistent with the intent of Title VII, when racial discrimination is
involved perception and appearance are everything. As with the joy of
beauty, the ugliness of bias can be in the eye of the beholder.” 107 The
court thought it “unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to attempt to
measure [Perkins’] percentage of Indian blood or to examine his
documentable connection to recognized existing tribes.”108 The court
further reasoned that “[e]mployers do not discriminate on the basis of
such factors;” instead, “[o]bjective appearance and employer
perception” are the most relevant factors in determining whether
unlawful discrimination occurred.109 In so holding, the court seemed
disinterested in Title VII’s precise wording, opting instead to take a
more pragmatic approach that emphasized how, in the context of
discrimination, perception is reality.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
Id. at 1263–64.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1266–77.
Id. at 1277.
Id.
Id. at 1277–78.
Id. at 1278.
Id.
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Despite its importance as the first case to consider misperception
discrimination, Perkins has failed to gain much traction with other
courts.110 Two opposing lines of cases have since emerged, with almost
no middle ground between them. As the following analysis indicates,
courts that reject misperception claims interpret Title VII as permitting
only discrimination claims based on an individual’s actual religion or
other protected characteristic, absent a congressional amendment
comparable to the ADA’s “regarded as” provision. By contrast, courts
that recognize such claims tend to take a more expansive view, focusing
on Title VII’s purpose and EEOC guidance. Although most of the key
misperception discrimination cases involve race or national origin
claims, courts have applied the reasoning from such cases to
misperception-based religious discrimination claims as well.111
A. Key Cases Rejecting Misperception Discrimination
The most influential case rejecting a misperception discrimination
claim is Butler v. Potter.112 Jesse Butler brought suit against his former
employer, the U.S. Postal Service, alleging discrimination based on his
perceived race and national origin.113 Butler claimed a supervisor
screamed obscenities at him and accused him of being Indian or Middle
Eastern, even though he identified as a “white Caucasian.”114 The
district court dismissed Butler’s claim on summary judgment, reasoning
that Title VII only protects employees belonging to a protected class
and “says nothing about protection of persons who are perceived to
belong to a protected class.”115 In what has subsequently become the
most oft-cited language from the decision, the court further explained
that “Congress has shown, through the Rehabilitation Act, and the
110. In fact, only two courts have even referenced Perkins in deciding the
validity of Title VII misperception claims. Both courts found Perkins persuasive and
followed its holding. See Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No.
3:08-cv-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14971, at *12–15 (D. Nev. Feb.
19, 2010); Greene v. Swain Cnty. P’ship for Health, 342 F. Supp. 2d 442, 451–52
(W.D.N.C. 2004).
111. See Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78944, at *8–11 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); Smith v. Specialty Pool
Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72551, at *14–16 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 24, 2008); Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-3124,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007).
112. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
113. Id. at 847–48.
114. Id. at 846.
115. Id. at 850.
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Americans with Disabilities Act that it knows how to enact legislation
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected
class.”116 Implicit, of course, in the court’s observation was the
assumption that Congress deliberately chose not to include “regarded
as” language in Title VII because it did not want to allow misperception
discrimination claims. Curiously, the court claimed to be unaware of
any contrary authority that would allow Butler’s claim to survive
summary judgment.117 It is peculiar that the court would not at least
acknowledge Perkins, which, although not controlling per se, was
decided just ten years earlier by a district court within the same circuit.
Two years later, Uddin v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp. 118
presented facts similar to those at issue in Butler. Zaheer Uddin
claimed he was harassed and eventually terminated because his
coworkers misperceived him as Middle Eastern, when in reality he was
from India.119 Uddin alleged his coworkers asked him, “What’s going
on with your cousin in Afghanistan?” (in reference to Osama bin
Laden) and “Can you marry four wives?” and commented that “a
Middle-Easterner like [Uddin] would never make it through airport
security while carrying a particular product prototype.”120 In dismissing
Uddin’s perceived national origin claim, the court cited Butler for the
proposition that “Title VII does not explicitly protect persons who are
perceived to belong to a protected class.”121 The court did not discuss
whether Title VII implicitly protects victims of misperception
discrimination. Like in Butler, the court claimed to be unaware of any
precedent to the contrary, again ignoring the Perkins decision.122
In Lewis v. North General Hospital,123 the district court built off
the Butler analysis in even more forcefully rejecting a misperception
claim.124 Darren Lewis claimed his coworkers wrongly perceived him
as Muslim after he temporarily changed his name to Serh Talmadge
Farid Efe.125 He believed this misperception led to rumors he was a
116.
117.
118.
Ga. June 1,
2006).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
No. 1:05-CV-1115-TWT-GGB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101798 (N.D.
2006), adopted by 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47238 (N.D. Ga. June 30,
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *14.
Id.
502 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 393–94.
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“child molester,” “not an American,” “homophobic,” and “racist.” 126
In granting the hospital summary judgment, the court first determined
that Lewis had not articulated a factual basis for his perceived-religion
claim.127 Although it could have ended its analysis there, the court
further asserted that “the protections of Title VII do not extend to
persons who are merely ‘perceived’ to belong to a protected class.” 128
The court then made explicit what Butler left implicit: “If Congress had
wanted to permit a similar cause of action under Title VII for
‘perceived religion’ discrimination, it could have so provided. It did
not.”129
The only appellate case rejecting a misperception discrimination
claim is El v. Max Daetwyler Corp. 130 Darryl El alleged he was
terminated because his employer misperceived him as a Muslim, when
in reality he was a Universalist.131 The district court dismissed El’s
claim based on the absence of “regarded as” language in Title VII. 132
The Fourth Circuit upheld the decision on appeal, explaining in a
four-sentence opinion that it found “no reversible error” in the record
and “affirm[ed] for the reasons stated by the district court.” 133 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit declined to expound on the district court’s reasoning
and consequently missed an opportunity to provide much-needed
appellate analysis of why Title VII precludes misperception
discrimination claims.
The Butler, Uddin, and Lewis decisions, together with the
appellate authority of El, have provided like-minded courts with all the
authority they feel is necessary to deny misperception claims. Since
Lewis was decided in 2007, seven other courts have declined to
recognize misperception discrimination claims under Title VII. 134
126. Id. at 394–95.
127. Id. at 401.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 451 F. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
131. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09cv415, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
49645, at *1 (W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011).
132. Id. at *12–15.
133. El, 451 F. App’x at 258.
134. See Sears v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-1322, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58148, at *21 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 2014); Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS,
LLC, No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154504, at *9–10 (D. Kan. Oct. 28,
2013); Guthrey v. Calif. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:10-cv-02177-AWI-BAM,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89174, at *16 n.2 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2012); Burrage v.
FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10CV2755, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43365, at *13–14
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); El, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49645, at *12–15; Adler v.
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Without exception, each court relied on Butler’s narrow interpretation
of Title VII’s text.135 While it is certainly understandable that these
courts would cite to other cases reaching their same conclusion, what is
surprising is that not one has acknowledged that several courts have
reached the opposite conclusion. Some courts have even gone so far as
to claim to be unaware of any authority that would allow a
misperception discrimination claim.136 Consequently, these courts have
made no effort to reconcile their position with the opposing line of
cases.
Likewise, these courts have yet to acknowledge, much less
resolve, the ambiguity resulting from the 1991 amendment to Title VII.
While it is true that § 2000e-2(a)(1) could be read in isolation as
prohibiting only discrimination based on a person’s actual religion, 137 it
is equally true that, standing alone, subsection (m) suggests religious
misperception claims are cognizable when religion in general motivates
an adverse employment action.138 Although courts must attempt to read
a statute in a manner that harmonizes its provisions and avoids
ambiguity,139 there has been no such effort by courts rejecting
misperception discrimination claims,140 and just one court recognizing
such claims has attempted to do so.141
Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 07 C 4203, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at
*11–12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008); Lopez-Galvan v. Mens Wearhouse, No. 3:06cv537,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53456, at *23–24 (W.D.N.C. July 10, 2008).
135. See cases cited supra note 134.
136. See, e.g., Sears, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58148, at *21 (concluding that
“the plaintiff has provided no legal basis supporting her ‘regarded as’ claims under
Title VII and such claims have not been recognized by the courts”); Yousif, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 154504, at *11 (“Plaintiff cites no valid authority recognizing perceived
discrimination claims under Title VII, and the court finds none.”).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination
against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin”).
138. Id. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”); Greene, supra note 6,
at 117–18 (arguing that a “faithful construal” of subsections (a)(1) and (m), in light of
Case and Clark’s interpretive memorandum, “permits [claims of intentional
discrimination] on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed characteristics regardless of
whether such treatment derives from the plaintiff’s self-ascribed or mistaken identity”).
139. See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (11th Cir. 2009) (A statute must be
read so as “to give full effect to each of its provisions.”); United States v. Able Time,
Inc., 545 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (Where the plain language of a statute is
ambiguous, conflicting provisions “should be interpreted harmoniously.”).
140. Greene, supra note 6, at 118 (“[N]o express deconstruction of Title VII’s
original and more recent statutory language or of Title VII’s purpose and meaning
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Furthermore, although the EEOC has been outspoken in
acknowledging misperception discrimination, these courts pay almost
no attention to the EEOC’s position. In fact, just one court has even
acknowledged the federal regulations or other EEOC materials in
support of misperception discrimination. In Yousif v. Landers McClarty
Olathe KS, LLC,142 the plaintiff cited to and attached the EEOC
Compliance Manual and an EEOC fact sheet in support of his claim of
misperception discrimination.143 The court made short work of these
documents, deeming them “unpersuasive here and not entitled to any
special deference, especially when the explicit language in Title VII and
clear case law stand for the opposite proposition.” 144
Perhaps most perplexing is these courts’ seeming disregard for
how their interpretation of Title VII undermines the statute’s goal of
ending discrimination in the workplace. None of these courts
acknowledge how their interpretation of Title VII disadvantages victims
of misperception discrimination, who are denied their day in court
simply because their employers were mistaken about their religious
beliefs. Nor do any of the courts concede that their construal of Title
VII permits employers to discriminate, so long as their perception of an
individual’s religion is inaccurate. Instead, they appear content to
mechanically apply Butler to reach a conclusion that seems at odds with
Title VII’s express goals.
Rigid adherence to such a narrow interpretation of § 2000e-2(a)(1)
seems curious in light of subsection (m), EEOC guidance, and Title
VII’s overarching purpose. One possible reason for this is because of
how courts tend to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework to disparate-treatment claims where there is no direct
evidence of discrimination. The Supreme Court established this
framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,145 a case involving a
claim that the employer refused to hire the plaintiff because he was
black.146 The Court explained that in order to prevail on such a claim,
Green initially had to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
emerges in the opinions [rejecting Title VII misperception discrimination
claims] . . . .”).
141. See Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 847
(D. Md. 2015).
142. No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154504 (D. Kan. Oct. 28,
2013).
143. Id. at *10.
144. Id.
145. 411 U.S. 792, 794–96 (1973).
146. Id.
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showing (1) he belonged to a racial minority, (2) he applied and was
qualified for the position, (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected,
and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applications from persons with Green’s same
qualifications.147 The burden then would shift to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting Green’s
application, and Green would thereafter bear the burden of showing the
employer’s reason was a pretext for discrimination. 148 Out of necessity,
courts occasionally modify certain elements of the prima facie case to
adapt to different forms of disparate treatment; yet the one element that
has remained constant is the requirement that a plaintiff belong to a
protected class.149 As Professor Wendy Greene points out, courts that
reject misperception discrimination claims appear to be engaging in a
literal application of the protected class element of the McDonnell
Douglas framework, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly
cautioned that the elements of the prima facie case were never intended
to be applied in formulaic fashion. 150 She argues that the protected class
element may simply have been the manifestation of the facts at issue in
McDonnell Douglas.151 Professor Greene also contends that when
articulating the membership prong, perhaps “the Supreme Court did not
contemplate that a Title VII discrimination plaintiff’s allegations of
invidious, differential treatment may not comport with [one’s]

147. Id. at 802.
148. Id. at 802, 804.
149. See, e.g., Duffy v. Belk, Inc., 477 F. App’x 91, 94 (4th Cir. 2012) (In the
context of an age-based reduction-in-force claim, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing “(1) he qualified as a member of the protected class,
(2) he was demoted or terminated, (3) at the time of his termination, he met the
employer’s legitimate expectations, and (4) he was replaced by a substantially younger
individual.”); Wooler v. Citizens Bank, 274 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (To
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, a plaintiff must show “(1) she
was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; and (3) she
suffered an adverse employment decision under circumstances that give rise to an
inference of discrimination.”).
150. Greene, supra note 6, at 118–19; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802 n.13 (“[F]acts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification . . .
of the prima facie proof required from [the plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations.”); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (reiterating that the McDonnell Douglas test “was never intended
to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of the common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination”).
151. Greene, supra note 6, at 119.
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self-ascribed identity.”152 She further suggests that the membership
prong “may have also been a function of the lack of clarity at the time
concerning whether Title VII was solely meant to redress
discrimination against nonwhites, or if all individuals regardless of their
classification would be protected against discrimination.” 153
In short, courts that reject misperception discrimination claims
almost exclusively rely on the fact that Congress has not amended Title
VII to include “regarded as” language to justify their position. Their
disinclination to address the line of cases permitting misperception
claims, reconcile their interpretation of § 2000e-2(a)(1) with subsection
(m), consider the EEOC’s guidance, or acknowledge the difficulty of
their position in light of Title VII’s express purpose may stem from a
narrow interpretation of subsection (a)(1) in isolation, as well as strict
adherence to the membership prong of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Both rationales seem tenuous at best.
B. Key Cases Recognizing Misperception Discrimination
Unlike cases rejecting misperception discrimination claims, courts
that recognize such claims benefit from substantive appellate decisions
to guide their analyses. The first appellate case to directly address
misperception discrimination under Title VII was EEOC v. WC&M
Enterprises, Inc.154 Mohommed Rafiq was born in India and was a
practicing Muslim.155 As with the plaintiffs in Butler and Uddin, Rafiq
alleged his coworkers misperceived him as Middle Eastern. 156
Following the September 11 attacks, Rafiq’s coworkers allegedly
implied he was a terrorist, began calling him “Taliban,” and often
referred to him as an “Arab.”157 Like in Butler, the district court
dismissed Rafiq’s perceived national origin claim because none of the
alleged harassment related to the fact he was Indian. 158 The Fifth
Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s assessment, holding “a party is
able to establish a discrimination claim based on its own national origin
even though the discriminatory acts do not identify the victim’s actual
country of origin.”159 The Fifth Circuit considered the EEOC’s
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 396.
Id. at 396–97.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Id.
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guidance, noting that the Commission had defined national origin
discrimination “broadly” in the federal regulations to include
discrimination undertaken because an individual possesses the
characteristics of a national origin group. 160 The court further observed
that the EEOC had elsewhere explained that a national origin
discrimination claim does not require proof that the discriminator had
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s national origin; “it is enough to
show that the complainant was treated differently because of his or her
foreign accent, appearance, or physical characteristics.”161 Based on
this guidance, the court concluded Rafiq’s country of origin was
irrelevant; the employer’s misperception that he was Middle Eastern
was sufficient to allow his claim to survive.162
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in
Jones v. UPS Ground Freight.163 One of the key issues on appeal was
whether the trier of fact could take into account a misperception-based
racial slur in determining whether Reginald Jones endured a hostile
work environment.164 Jones alleged that while on a training run a
coworker told him, “I know how to train you Indians.”165 When Jones
responded that he was not Native American, the coworker allegedly
replied, “I don’t care what race you are, I trained your kind before.” 166
Citing WC&M Enterprises, the court held that “a harasser’s use of
epithets associated with a different ethnic or racial minority than the
plaintiff will not necessarily shield an employer from liability for a
hostile work environment.”167 The court did not analyze the
reasonableness of the coworker’s misperception other than to note in
passing that perhaps the slur was directed at Jones “based on his dark
complection [sic] or some other perceived shared characteristic with
Native Americans.”168
Ironically, perhaps the appellate case that courts cite most often in
recognizing misperception discrimination under Title VII actually
involved an ADA retaliation claim. In Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital,
160. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2015)).
161. Id. (quoting Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45
Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,633 (Dec. 29, 1980)).
162. Id. at 402.
163. 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012).
164. Id. at 1299–300.
165. Id. at 1288.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1299 (citing EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401 (5th
Cir. 2007)).
168. Id. at 1300.
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Inc.,169 Greg Fogleman alleged he was fired because his employer
mistakenly believed he was assisting his father in a separate lawsuit
against the hospital.170 The district court dismissed the claim,
concluding the ADA did not support a perception theory of
retaliation.171 The Third Circuit disagreed, explaining that the law
focuses on an employer’s subjective reasons for discriminating against
an employee, “so it matters not whether the reasons behind the
employer’s discriminatory animus are actually correct as a factual
matter.”172 It then provided an analogy that subsequent courts often
reference in recognizing misperception claims in the Title VII
context:173
[I]magine a Title VII discrimination case in which an
employer refuses to hire a prospective employee because he
thinks that the applicant is a Muslim. The employer is still
discriminating on the basis of religion even if the applicant he
refuses to hire is not in fact a Muslim. What is relevant is that
the applicant, whether Muslim or not, was treated worse than
he otherwise would have been for reasons prohibited by the
statute.174
This analogy makes clear that, like the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
the Third Circuit reads Title VII as permitting claims of misperception
discrimination.175 The court seemed unconcerned with the accuracy of
the hypothetical employer’s perception of the individual’s religion.
Instead, the relevant inquiry was whether the individual was “treated
worse” because of religion more generally.176

169. 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002).
170. Id. at 564.
171. Id. at 571.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 78944, at *9 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); Arsham v. Mayor & City
Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 848 (D. Md. 2015); Smith v. Specialty Pool
Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72551, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
24, 2008).
174. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571.
175. See Greene, supra note 6, at 156–62 (discussing these Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuit opinions as precedential support for Title VII misperception
discrimination claims).
176. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571.
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A final appellate decision that also has proven influential is Estate
of Amos v. City of Page, Arizona.177 Like Fogleman, the case is
significant even though it does not involve a Title VII claim. Burton
Amos was involved in an automobile accident near Page, Arizona, and
subsequently fled the scene and disappeared into the desert. 178 Despite
discovering blood inside Amos’ vehicle and tracks leading into the
desert that evidenced a person possibly in distress, the responding
officers cut short their search when their flashlights lost power. 179 After
Amos’ remains were discovered nearly a year later, his estate brought
suit against the City, alleging it had violated Amos’ due process and
equal protection rights by conducting an insufficient search. 180 The
estate argued that the City failed to effectively search for Amos because
it misperceived him as Native American, when in reality he was
white.181 Because Page is a border town surrounded by the Navajo
Reservation, it is apparently common for Native Americans involved in
car accidents to leave the scene, abscond into the desert, and call the
police the next day to report their vehicle as stolen. 182 In reversing
summary judgment for the City, the Ninth Circuit held that
misperception discrimination claims are cognizable under the Equal
Protection Clause.183 The court pointed out that the City’s
misperception of Amos as Native American “does not make that
discrimination or its resulting injury less direct,” nor was it “less
malevolent because it was based upon an erroneous assumption.” 184 The
court concluded, “Amos should be viewed as . . . the police officers
viewed him: as a Native American.” 185 Thus, like the Perkins and
Fogleman courts, the Ninth Circuit focused on the defendant’s
subjective belief rather than Amos’ actual race.
With the backing of four courts of appeals, like-minded district
courts are outspoken about what they view as the injustices of denying
misperception claims, characterizing the contrary position as
“superficially logical, but fundamentally abhorrent,” 186 “as offensive as
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
Md. 2015).

257 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1089–90.
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 845 (D.
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it is incorrect,”187 and “objectively unreasonable.”188 One court
remarked that “[t]he fact that [the defendant] ignorantly used the wrong
derogatory ethnic remark toward the plaintiff is inconsequential.”189
According to another court, “Plaintiffs do not lose the protection of
discrimination laws because they are discriminated against for the
wrong reasons.”190 Another court reasoned that permitting an employer
to escape liability simply because of misperception “would allow
prohibited discrimination to go unredressed on the basis of an error in
no way diminishing the harm to the victim of the discrimination.” 191
Aside from these broader policy arguments, courts have also
addressed the textual argument relied upon by Butler and its progeny.
For instance, in Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,192 the
court voiced surprise that district courts have rejected misperception
claims based on the text of Title VII, reasoning that “Congress may not
have thought it necessary to revise Title VII to conform to the wording
of the ADA if it was aware of the EEOC’s . . . long-standing
interpretation of Title VII.”193 The court found the EEOC guidance to
be consistent with § 2000e-2(m).194 According to the court, subsection
(a)(1), which prohibits discrimination based on “such person’s . . .
religion,” must be read together with subsection (m), which prohibits
discrimination where religion (or some other protected trait) motivates
an adverse employment decision.195 “Doing so,” the court explained,
“allows the conclusion that Congress did not intend to cabin Title VII’s
prohibition of invidious discrimination such that some forms of
discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics are permissible.
The narrow reading of section a . . . is inconsistent with Title VII’s
purpose . . . .”196
187. Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, No. 10 C 8196, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103310, at *19 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2013).
188. Wright v. Yacovone, No. 5:12-cv-27, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157544, at
*67 (D. Vt. Nov. 2, 2012).
189. LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (D. Neb.
1999).
190. Langadinos v. Appalachian Sch. of Law, No. 1:05CV00039, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20958, at *4 n.6 (W.D. W. Va. Sept. 25, 2005).
191. Henao v. Wyndham Vacations Resorts, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 978, 987
(D. Haw. 2013).
192. 85 F. Supp. 3d 841 (D. Md. 2015).
193. Id. at 846.
194. Id. at 847.
195. Id. at 845–47.
196. Id. at 847; see also Henao, 927 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (acknowledging that
although Congress did not expressly address misperception discrimination in Title VII,
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Although most reported cases recognizing misperception
discrimination involve race or national origin claims, three courts have
specifically addressed misperception-based religious discrimination. In
Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union Free School District,197 Lauren Berrios
alleged she was terminated from her teaching position because her
employer mistakenly believed she was a Wiccan. 198 She alternatively
claimed she was fired because of her actual religion, which is Jewish. 199
Before sending the case to the jury, the court entered an order noting
that Title VII does not expressly recognize misperception discrimination
and that two district courts had rejected such claims.200 But the court
did not feel comfortable dismissing the claim and instead advised it
would instruct the jury on both the perceived and actual religious
discrimination claims, so that if the jury found in favor of Berrios on
the misperception claim, the finding would be clear and could be
appealed.201 In essence, the court was unsure how to rule on the
misperception discrimination claim, so it set up the jury instructions in
a way that would allow the Second Circuit to decide the issue. 202
In Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors,203 Robert Smith alleged he
was harassed based on a supervisor’s misperception that he was
Jewish.204 Even though Smith was Catholic, the supervisor allegedly
insisted he was Jewish and repeatedly called him “Hebrew,”
“Abraham,” “Jew Boy,” and “Kike.”205 The supervisor also allegedly
told Smith that “Hitler did not do a good enough job because you . . .
are still alive.”206 The court denied the employer’s summary judgment
motion, despite acknowledging that neither the Supreme Court nor the

reading the statute to allow misperception claims “is entirely consistent with what
Congress . . . [was] attempting to prohibit”).
197. No. CV 02-3124, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
2007).
198. Id. at *1.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *2–3.
201. Id. at *3–4.
202. The case never reached the Second Circuit, as the jury returned a verdict
for the employer on both counts of discrimination. See Judgment in a Civil Case,
Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-3124 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2007).
203. No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72551 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24,
2008).
204. Id. at *4.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Third Circuit had decided the issue of misperception discrimination. 207
The court found persuasive the Third Circuit’s analogy in Fogelman. 208
After quoting the entire analogy, the court concluded that a reasonable
jury could find that the employer discriminated against Smith based on
the mistaken belief that he practiced Judaism.209
The most recent case to consider a religious misperception claim
was Kallabat v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.210 Basil Kallabat, an
Iraqi, claimed his coworkers harassed him because they mistakenly
believed he was Muslim.211 According to Kallabat, his coworkers
ridiculed him for wearing his hat backward, remarking that it looked
like a “topi” (a skullcap worn by Muslim men for religious reasons). 212
There was also graffiti in the restroom showing what appeared to be the
World Trade Center with a plane crashing into it, with a caption stating
that Kallabat was learning how to fly. 213 In rejecting the employer’s
argument that misperception claims are not cognizable under Title VII,
the court acknowledged the line of cases invalidating such claims but
noted the issue remained undecided in the Sixth Circuit.214 Like in
Smith, the court found persuasive the Fogelman analogy, concluding
that a reasonable jury could find that Kallabat was discriminated against
based on the misperception he was Muslim.215
In short, courts that recognize misperception discrimination tend to
focus on Title VII’s overarching purpose rather than any single
provision of the statutory text. These courts emphasize the unfairness of
allowing an employer to escape liability for discrimination simply
because the employer is mistaken about the victim’s religion (or other
protected trait). In addition to this policy rationale, these courts have
also relied on the text of Title VII and EEOC guidance to support their
position.

207.
208.
209.
210.
2015).
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at *13–15.
Id. at *14–15.
Id. at *15–16.
No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78944 (E.D. Mich. June 18,
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

*1–3.
*10.
*8.
*9–11.
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IV. MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION AFTER ABERCROMBIE

Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether
misperception discrimination claims are cognizable under Title VII, its
recent decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. may
ultimately put this issue to rest. This Part analyzes Abercrombie and
explains how the decision requires courts to recognize
misperception-based religious discrimination claims going forward.
A. The Abercrombie Decision
Abercrombie & Fitch is a clothing retailer that is known for being
highly image conscious.216 The company maintains a Look Policy to
ensure its employees properly and consistently model Abercrombie’s
brands.217 This policy prohibits “caps” because Abercrombie considers
them too informal.218 Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim who wears a
headscarf in accordance with her religious tenets, applied for a position
at an Abercrombie store.219 The store’s assistant manager interviewed
Elauf and rated her as qualified to be hired. 220 The interviewer did not
ask Elauf why she wore the headscarf, nor did Elauf volunteer that
information.221 The assistant manager was unsure whether Elauf’s
headscarf would violate the Look Policy, so she consulted with her
district manager.222 Although the assistant manager did not know for
certain that Elauf was Muslim, she told the district manager that she
thought Elauf wore the headscarf because of her religious beliefs. 223
The district manager then instructed her not to hire Elauf because her
headscarf would violate the Look Policy.224
The EEOC brought suit on Elauf’s behalf, alleging Abercrombie’s
refusal to hire (and accommodate) Elauf violated Title VII.225 The
district court granted the EEOC summary judgment as to liability. 226
216. See Flake, supra note 48, at 738.
217. See id. at 738–39.
218. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2034 (Alito, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 2031.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275
(N.D. Okla. 2011).
226. Id. at 1287.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded Abercrombie summary
judgment, holding that the defendant could not be liable for denying a
religious accommodation because Elauf did not provide the company
with actual knowledge that she would need an accommodation. 227 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Title VII’s
prohibition against religious discrimination “applies only where an
applicant has informed the employer of his need for an
accommodation.”228
In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held that an
applicant or employee need only show that her need for an
accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse
employment action, not that the employer had knowledge of her
need.229 While this holding is remarkable in its own right, the Court’s
underlying rationale is equally significant. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia first explained that Title VII prohibits two kinds of
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.230 He then
noted that Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision prohibits employers
from failing to hire an applicant “because of such individual’s . . .
religion.”231 The parties did not dispute that Abercrombie failed to hire
Elauf, so the only question before the Court was whether Elauf was not
hired “because of” her religious practice. 232 Justice Scalia observed that
although the “because of” language in § 2000e-2(a)(1) would ordinarily
require but-for causation, “Title VII relaxes this standard” because
subsection (m) prohibits even making a protected characteristic a
“motivating factor” in an adverse employment action. 233
In what will surely become the most critical line from the decision,
Justice Scalia subsequently explained that “[i]t is significant that
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose a knowledge requirement.” 234 Unlike
the ADA, which only requires accommodation of “known physical or
mental limitations,” Title VII does not mandate that an employer
accommodate only known religious practices. 235 “Instead, the
intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives, regardless
227.
Cir. 2013).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1131 (10th
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2031.
Id. at 2032.
Id. at 2031–32.
Id. at 2032 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2032–33 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
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of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” 236 According to Justice Scalia,
“[m]otive and knowledge are separate concepts.” 237 An employer with
knowledge of an applicant’s religious practices would not be liable for
refusing to hire the applicant so long as avoiding the accommodation is
not the employer’s motive, but “an employer who acts with the motive
of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no
more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be
needed.”238
Based on this reasoning, the Court pronounced what it considered
a “straightforward” rule: “An employer may not make an applicant’s
religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment
decisions.”239 In announcing this rule, the Court rejected the notion that
an applicant must inform the potential employer of her need for a
religious
accommodation,
reiterating
that
Title
VII’s
“disparate-treatment provision prohibits actions taken with the motive
of avoiding the need for accommodating a religious practice. A request
for an accommodation, or the employer’s certainty that the practice
exists, may make it easier to infer motive, but is not a necessary
condition of liability.”240 Thus, even if an employer has no actual
knowledge that an applicant would need a religious accommodation, as
long as the employer subjectively believes this to be the case and
refuses to hire the applicant based on its belief, the employer has
violated Title VII.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito took issue with the Court’s
declaration that Title VII does not impose a knowledge requirement. 241
He reasoned that if there truly were no knowledge requirement,
Abercrombie could be held liable even if the interviewer thought Elauf
was wearing the headscarf for purely secular reasons. 242 According to
Justice Alito, such an interpretation is “surely wrong.” 243 In his view,
the Court should have determined “that an employer cannot be held
liable for taking an adverse action because of an employee’s religious
practice unless the employer knows that the employee engages in the
practice for a religious reason.”244 The majority opinion only briefly
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 2033.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
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responds to this argument, asserting that “[w]hile a knowledge
requirement cannot be added to the motive requirement, it is arguable
that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least
suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice.”245 The
Court chose not to further explore this point, explaining that because
the issue was not presented in this case, “[i]t seems to us inappropriate
to resolve this unargued point by way of dictum, as the concurrence
would do.”246
B. Abercrombie’s Application to Misperception Discrimination
Although Abercrombie involved a religious accommodation claim,
its holding is directly applicable to other forms of disparate treatment.
Indeed, the Court made clear that failing to accommodate an
employee’s religious practices is a form of disparate treatment, noting
that in this case, “[f]ailing to hire . . . is synonymous with refusing to
accommodate the religious practice.”247 It likewise rejected
Abercrombie’s alternative contention that “a claim based on a failure to
accommodate an applicant’s religious practices must be raised as a
disparate-impact claim, not a disparate-treatment claim.”248 Because an
employer’s failure to accommodate is a form of disparate treatment,
there is no reason Abercrombie should not apply with equal force to
other forms of disparate treatment where misperception discrimination
may be even more likely to arise.
Abercrombie likewise is no less applicable because the case did not
involve employer misperception about the applicant’s religion.
Although the assistant manager correctly guessed that Elauf wore a
headscarf for religious reasons, the Court seemed uninterested in this
fact.249 If the assistant manager had been incorrect in her assumption
about why Elauf wore a headscarf, the outcome of the case almost
certainly would have remained unchanged, as the Court’s central
holding—that Title VII does not impose a knowledge requirement—
suggests that what an employer does or does not know about an

245. Id. at 2033 n.3.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2032 n.2.
248. Id. at 2033.
249. The Court mentions just once, by way of a footnote, that Abercrombie
knew Elauf wore the headscarf for religious reasons. See id. at 2033 n.3
(“Abercrombie knew—or at least suspected—that the scarf was worn for religious
reasons.”).
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individual’s religion is irrelevant to whether it can be held liable for
religious discrimination.
The Court made clear that an employer’s motive, not its actual
knowledge, is the gravamen of a disparate-treatment claim. Even
though Elauf did not provide Abercrombie with actual knowledge of
her need for an accommodation, the fact that Abercrombie suspected—
substantiated or not—that Elauf might need an accommodation and
refused to hire her on that basis was enough to hold the defendant
liable. Just as the Supreme Court refused to allow Abercrombie to hide
behind its lack of actual knowledge about Elauf’s religious practices, by
extension courts must also refrain from giving employers a free pass to
discriminate based on their misperception (i.e., lack of knowledge)
about an individual’s religion. Because it is motive, not knowledge, that
matters, the focus in religious discrimination cases going forward must
be on whether religion—actual or perceived—motivated an adverse
employment decision.
Critics of this view may point to two passages in the majority
opinion that could potentially be misconstrued as requiring a religious
discrimination claim to be based on an employee’s actual religion.
First, in deciphering the “because of” language of § 2000e-2(a)(1), the
Court observed that “an individual’s actual religious practice may not
be a motivating factor in failing to hire, in refusing to hire, and so
on.”250 Second, after announcing the rule that an employer cannot make
an applicant’s religion, “confirmed or otherwise,” a factor in
employment decisions, the Court gave the example of an employer that
suspects an applicant is Jewish and thus could not work on Saturdays. 251
The Court explained that “[i]f the applicant actually requires an
accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer’s desire to
avoid the prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his
decision, the employer violates Title VII.” 252 Although both passages
refer to a person’s “actual” religious practices, the Court does not
condition liability on this basis. These references are likely a reflection
of the Court’s sensitivity toward only deciding the issues before it based
on the precise facts of the case. Lurking in the background of the case
is the reality that Elauf actually would have needed an accommodation,
so it is understandable that the Court would frame its analysis to be

250.
251.
252.

Id. at 2032.
Id. at 2033.
Id.
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consistent with that fact.253 Moreover, the decision focuses almost
exclusively on Abercrombie’s motivation for denying Elauf
employment and makes almost no mention of Elauf’s actual religious
practices. If Elauf’s actual religion had been vital to the outcome of the
case, the Court almost certainly would have placed greater emphasis on
such a crucial fact.
In actuality, the application of Abercrombie to misperception cases
falls squarely in line with the recent shift in employment discrimination
jurisprudence from an antisubordination to an anticlassification
orientation.254 Anticlassification values prohibit practices that “classify
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden
category.”255 Whereas the antisubordination principle emphasizes
broad, group-based subordination that enforces the inferior social status
of historically oppressed groups, “the anticlassification principle
reflects a narrower objective of eliminating individual unfairness.” 256
Such unfairness stems, in part, from an employer’s immoral belief that
“some types of people are morally worthier than others.” 257 Hence,
when a person is judged to be of lesser moral worth and is treated
accordingly, that treatment is morally wrong regardless of its effects or
whether the judgment was indeed accurate. 258 From an
anticlassificationist view, applying Abercrombie to misperception
discrimination claims is logical, and in fact necessary, because it holds
employers accountable for making immoral judgments about an
individual’s worth based on religion—a characteristic that correlates so
weakly with job performance that Congress has forbidden employers
from almost ever considering it.

253. See id. at 2033 n.3 (declining to rule on an unargued point by way of
dictum).
254. See generally Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in
Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955 (2012) (arguing that recent
laws, such as the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), signal a shift away from antisubordination and
toward anticlassification values).
255. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003).
256. Areheart, supra note 254, at 957–58 (quoting Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004)).
257. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 161 (1992).
258. See id. at 159.
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After Abercrombie, it would be improper for a court to dismiss a
religious discrimination claim based on an employer’s misperception of
an employee’s religion, when the Supreme Court has declared that an
employer’s motive—not its knowledge—determines liability. In light of
the Supreme Court’s decree that Title VII does not impose an “actual
knowledge” requirement,259 it seems illogical that an employer could
escape liability simply because it was mistaken about an individual’s
religious beliefs. Furthermore, if an employer’s motivation is what
matters, courts cannot ignore the fact that an employer’s motivation for
discriminating against an employee is just as intentional and malevolent
in perceived-religion cases as it is in conventional discrimination
cases.260 After Abercrombie, courts cannot allow an employer’s
knowledge, or lack thereof, to trump its motivation. Whether Ashley is
Catholic or Mormon is neither here nor there; what matters is that
religion motivated the principal’s adverse employment decision. The
principal’s action violated Title VII before, and especially after,
Abercrombie.
V. THE FUTURE OF MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION
Up until now, there has been considerable disagreement among the
courts as to the validity of misperception discrimination claims under
Title VII. Courts that reject such claims focus almost exclusively on the
absence of “regarded as” language from the text of Title VII to support
their position. But the lack of such language hardly settles the question;
the statutory text itself is susceptible to multiple interpretations, and the
legislative record, EEOC guidance, and the broader federal
antidiscrimination scheme favor recognition of such claims. In
Abercrombie, the Supreme Court emphatically declared that an
employer’s actual knowledge of an employee’s religious practices is
irrelevant to Title VII liability. Instead, it is the employer’s motive that
matters. The implication of this holding for misperception
discrimination claims is clear: an employer is liable if religion (or
another protected trait) motivates an adverse employment decision,
regardless of whether the employer has actual knowledge of the
individual’s religion.

259. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).
260. See Greene, supra note 6, at 101–02 (“In conventionally framed
discrimination cases, the employer’s perception of the plaintiff’s identity simply
happens to comport with her self-perception.”).
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The most significant ramification of the Court’s holding is that
victims of misperception discrimination are now assured their day in
court, as the viability of their claims no longer hinges on whether the
employer perceived their religion correctly. Victims of misperception
discrimination are no longer second-class plaintiffs, whose claims are
somehow less worthy of adjudication. By treating misperception
discrimination claims like conventional discrimination claims, courts
acknowledge that the harm individuals suffer is no less valid or worthy
of reparation simply because an employer is mistaken about their
religious beliefs. In Ashley’s case, the injury she suffered (being passed
over for the teaching position because the principal mistakenly believed
she was Mormon) is not somehow less damaging because she is
actually Catholic. Whether Mormon or Catholic, Ashley was the victim
of religious discrimination and deserves to be compensated accordingly.
A second important implication of the Abercrombie decision is that
employers can no longer escape liability for religious discrimination
simply by pleading ignorance. The holding sends a clear message to
employers that discrimination based on stereotypes and unfounded
assumptions about an employee’s religion will not be tolerated. If
religion in any way motivates an employment decision, an employer
can and will be held liable. Moreover, removing this escape hatch may
motivate employers to better familiarize themselves with an employee’s
religious beliefs when necessary. This can help break down stereotypes,
promote greater tolerance and understanding, and reduce the risk of an
employer making unfair and erroneous assumptions about an
employee’s religion.
Third, by recognizing misperception discrimination claims, courts
appropriately shift the focus away from identity adjudication and onto
the employer’s motive. If the validity of a religious discrimination
claim were dependent upon the employer correctly perceiving the
employee’s religion, an employer could defeat the claim simply by
showing the employee was not a member of the religion to which the
employer thought she belonged. This could lead to personal and
invasive inquiry into an employee’s religious beliefs, which courts have
consistently maintained falls outside their realm of expertise in most
cases.261 Abercrombie renders a person’s actual religion irrelevant, thus
261. See Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 2014)
(“[J]udicial inquiry into the sincerity of a person’s religious belief must be handled with
a light touch, or judicial shyness. Examining religious convictions any more deeply
would stray into the realm of religious inquiry, an area into which we are forbidden to
tread. Indeed, the sincerity of a plaintiff’s engagement in a particular religious practice
is rarely challenged, and claims of sincere religious belief in a particular practice have
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eliminating the need to scrutinize a plaintiff’s religious beliefs. This
frees up courts to focus on an employer’s motivations, which the
Supreme Court has made clear is the touchstone of Title VII liability. It
likewise acknowledges what the Perkins court first observed more than
two decades ago: in the context of discrimination, an employer’s
perception is very much its reality.262
Fourth, Abercrombie’s reach is not limited only to
misperception-based
religious
discrimination.
Misperception
discrimination based on race, color, sex, and national origin is likewise
prohibited. Just as religious identity is becoming more complex, so,
too, are these other protected categories, due to “increased
immigration, cultural diversity, interracial marriages, and transracial
adoptions, as well as more formal recognition of mixed-race
classifications and more fluid conceptualizations of gender, racial, and
cultural identity.”263 After Abercrombie, individuals who are
misperceived as belonging to a particular race, national origin, or sex
are assured the same protections under Title VII as are victims of
conventional discrimination.
Finally, fully recognizing misperception discrimination claims will
move us closer to reaching Title VII’s goal of eradicating unlawful
workplace discrimination. In prohibiting discrimination based on a
person’s race, sex, religion, or national origin, Congress declared these
categories largely irrelevant to whether an individual is qualified for
employment.264 To eliminate employment decisions based on these
traits, it is not enough merely to ban discrimination based on an
individual’s actual characteristics. Instead, Title VII must prohibit
employers from using any of these protected characteristics as a basis
for discrimination, regardless of whether the victim actually possesses
the trait in question. Closing the misperception loophole will ensure
employers are held liable whenever religion or any other protected trait
motivates an adverse employment action.

been accepted on little more than the plaintiff’s credible assertions.” (citations omitted)
(quoting Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
262. See Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277–78
(N.D. Ohio 1994).
263. Greene, supra note 6, at 101.
264. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of
. . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”).

2016:87

Misperception-Based Religious Discrimination

133

CONCLUSION
The United States is in the midst of unprecedented religious
diversification. There are more religions and greater diversity of
religious expression than ever before. This remarkable shift in the
religious landscape increases the possibility of discrimination based on
misperceptions about an employee’s religion. Consequently, it is more
important than ever that courts hold employers liable whenever they
take an adverse employment action based on an individual’s religion,
whether perceived or actual. This will ensure victims of misperception
discrimination are adequately compensated for their damages, while
sending a strong message to employers that any form of religious
discrimination will not be tolerated.
The courts are presently divided over whether Title VII prohibits
misperception discrimination. Although legislative intent, EEOC
guidance, and the broader federal antidiscrimination scheme favor
recognition of misperception claims, some courts refuse to acknowledge
such claims until Congress amends Title VII to include a “regarded as”
provision comparable to the ADA. While a congressional amendment
may be ideal, it is not necessary after Abercrombie. Although the case
was decided in the context of a religious accommodation, its holding
directly applies to misperception-based religious discrimination claims.
The Supreme Court made clear that disparate-treatment liability under
Title VII is premised on an employer’s motives, not its actual
knowledge. As such, whether an employer is aware of an employee’s
actual religious beliefs is unimportant; what matters is whether religion
in general motivated the employment decision.
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act more than five decades ago
with the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. To reach
this goal, it is not enough to prohibit discrimination based on an
employee’s actual religion. Indeed, employers can and do discriminate
based on erroneous beliefs, assumptions, and stereotypes about
religion. And given the growing complexity of the religious landscape,
the likelihood of employers discriminating against employees based on
erroneous assumptions about religion is likely only to increase. Such
discrimination is no less malicious or injurious simply because the
employer was wrong. If anything, it may be worse because the
employer is not only biased but also ignorant. To truly end religious
discrimination in the workplace, Title VII must be read as prohibiting
both conventional and misperception-based discrimination. Although
this interpretation has long been defensible, after Abercrombie it seems
necessary.

